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SEPARATISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT

The panel was convened at 9:25 a.m., Friday, April 3, by its Chair, Siba Grovogui, who
introduced the panelists: Mortimer N. Sellers, University of Baltimore, Center for
International and Comparative Law; Deborah Cass, Australian National University Law
School; Fernando Tes6n, Arizona State University College of Law; and Diane Orentlicher,
Washington College of Law, American University.
SEPARATISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

by MN.S. Sellers'

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of democracies, or quasidemocracies, in Russia, South Africa, and throughout South America, the most powerful and
persistent opponents of popular sovereignty have receded, or admitted their mistakes, and
a new democratic triumphalism has entered the legal literature. Where Hugo Grotius once
boldly rejected the idea that supreme power necessarily resides in the people, frankly
viewing certain peoples (he mentions Cappadocians) as fit to be slaves,' some scholars now
assert an "emerging right of democratic governance" such that no government should be
considered legitimate without free, fair and frequent elections.2 At the same time, and in
some of the same places, new states have emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union and
the formerYugoslavia. Czechs, Slovaks, Scots, Quebecois, and many others in the provinces
or former provinces of larger states have asserted their separate national identities, seeking
plebiscites and claiming democratic support. If democracy is the measure of legitimacy, then
such votes should be decisive, and the subjects ofnondemocratic states should have the right
to secede, or rebel. Yet proponents of the right to democracy remain extraordinarily vague
about which groups should vote and be free. The peoples of non-self-governing colonial
territories enjoy the most widely recognized right to secession, but beyond that democrats
often equivocate? If democracy by means of general votes of the population is the ultimate
source of governmental legitimacy, then there can be no principled basis for dividing the
world into groups for voting. The larger the group, the greater the legitimacy, one might
suppose. If so, a consolidated universal world democracy would be the most just form of
government.
Democrats do not always seem to want this. To the extent that they do not, democracy
is not their fundamental value. Something else must explain the persisting separation
between peoples of the world, and justify democrats in accepting such divisions.4 But any
rule that justifies separation faces the opposite problem-of escalating fragmentation. If
minorities can separate from larger groups too easily, then they will do so, and each minority
will find minorities of its own, until each state is a state of one citizen, alone and unloved.
So separatists must have regulating values too, like democrats, to draw the line between
isolation and oppression.
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Separatism and the DemocraticEntitlement
Republicanism
In this paper I will address the limits of separatism and the democratic entitlement from
a republican perspective, by which I mean the perspective that views laws and legal systems
as justified, if at all, only when they serve the common good.' In fact, nearly all legal
systems purport to do so, or at least to serve "justice." This assertion ofjustice is the essence
of law, without which impositions of power lose the normative element that gives them
validity in any legal system. Republicans equate justice with the common good,7 and see the
purposes of government and society in promoting a harmony of interests, so that the good
of each individual contributes to the benefit of all.'
Republican doctrine developed primarily to serve the common good within states, such
as the Roman republic, Florence, England and the United States.9 Republican authors agreed
that popular sovereignty, the rule of law, the separation of powers, checks and balances,
representation, and elections would all be necessary to prevent any individual or group of
individuals from seizing control of government and running the state to serve private or
factional interests.' Republican conceptions such as thepopulus (people), libertas(liberty)
and jus gentium (law of nations) developed to serve this conception of separate peoples,
each united around its own sense ofjustice and agreement about the common good."
When republicans contemplated international relations, they did not seek a world
republic, despite their belief in universal human community, but rather an overarching
federation of republics, to coordinate their mutual relations. 3 For example, the framers of
the U.S. Constitution self-consciously established a federal system, guaranteeing separate
republican governments to each ofthe thirteen states.' 4 The problem for republicans overthe
centuries has been the question now faced for the first time by democrats, as they assert their
new right to plebiscites and voting: Who are the people? The boundaries between peoples
determine the jurisdiction of each republic, and the province of international law.
Democracy
Democracy in its strictest sense means "rule by the people," which is to say direct
participation in all decisions by every citizen, or at least by some large group of citizens
chosen, as in Athens, by lot. The excesses and ultimate failures of the Greek demagogues
made the Greek term democracyan epithet of abuse for two millennia, until the "Democratic
Republican" and later "Democratic" parties in the United States embraced certain aspects
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of the Athenian model, to differentiate themselves from their "Federalist Republican" and
later "National Republican" rivals. Alexis de Tocqueville's famous description ofdemocracy
in America used the word in a new way, to describe a state in which the people really did
seem to rule, albeit indirectly, through their elected representatives. 5 When contemporary
lawyers write of the "right to democracy," they probably mean to require "periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article 21).16
Proponents of the democratic entitlement assume its value as a source of legitimacy in
international law." Republicans value democracy too, but not as an ultimate value.

Republican popular sovereignty depends on the perception that unelected or unremovable
governments will always subvert the common interest to serve their own ends. Republican
doctrine requires democracy, not for its own sake, but because democracy facilities the
finding (or creation) of a common good for all citizens. Democracy is valuable because it
serves republican ends, by keeping rulers focused on the common good. The underlying
purpose is not to decide every issue by popular vote, but rather to secure good government
by periodic elections.
This instrumental value of democracy is important, because it explains the limits of
voting, and offers criteria for drawing boundaries between districts. The rule of law and
balance of powers play at least as large a role in republican government as does democracy,
by preventing majority tyranny, or thoughtless populism. 8 Republicans such as James
Madison 9 and Immanuel Kant20 made a point of distinguishing republicanism from
democracy precisely because democracy often imposes injustices, while republics should
not. Kant followed Livy in believing that peoples must be made ready for democracy, and
constrained by republican structures of government, before they can safely assume their
freedom and independent sovereignty.2'
InternationalLaw

The democratic entitlement first entered international law as part of the republican
complex of ideas that revived thejusgentium afterthe Protestant Reformation in Europe and
culminated in the writings of Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel.22 Grotius believed that
sovereignty ("imperium") over peoples ("populi") can be transferred only by means of
inheritance, lawful war,23 or consent,24 because peoples should never be understood to yield
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their "liberty" involuntarily.25 Rulers who violate the laws and the "republic" may be resisted
by force, Grotius suggested, 6 as may those who prove themselves to be enemies of the
people as a whole.27 Vattel confirmed that all sovereignty originates with the people, who
may (if they so choose) confer it on a senate or a monarch, 2 but only for the purpose of
serving the common good of all citizens.29 When a tyrant arises, such as Philip II of Spain,
his subjects may properly take arms to protect their liberty, as did the people of the
Netherlands, and create a new republic that serves the common good. 0
This underlying conception of popular sovereignty provides the law of nations with its
most important and enduring claim to obedience and respect. As Vattel explained it, nations
or states are political bodies or societies united to obtain their citizens' common good and
security."' This political union creates a new moral person, with obligations and rights of its
own. 2 The law of nations governs relationships between such states."3 Vattel suggested that
since nations are composed of individuals who are by nature free and independent, nations
must be free and independent too, 4 subject only to the law of nature and their own
commitments, freely made."5 Without this principle-that states in some sense speak for the
peoples they represent-international law would lose its moral authority. The UN Charter
recognizes the importance of this claim in its preamble, which purports to derive
constitutional authority from a mandate provided by "We the peoples of the United
Nations."
Contemporary international law endorses popular sovereignty through several other
charter provisions, and related resolutions and conventions of various international bodies.
The UN Charter maintains as one of its fundamental purposes "to develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" (Article 1[2]).36 This includes the peoples of non-self-governing territories, whose
metropolitan powers must help to develop each territory's "free political institutions"
(Article 73[b]), with a view toward their eventual "self-government" or "independence"
(Article 76[b]). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "everyone has the
right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives" (Article 21 [1 ]), as selected in "periodic and genuine elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage" (Article 21 [3]). This right reappears in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which reaffirms that "the inherent dignity" and the
"equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [are] the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world" (Preamble), so that "all peoples have the right of
self-determination," by virtue of which "they freely determine their political status" (Article
I [1]) through "genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage"
(Article 25 [b]).
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Peoples

The validity of international law rests on the self-determination of peoples in the same
way that the legitimacy of the world's separate states rests on the ultimate sovereignty of
their various populations. From Cicero to Vattel to the UN Charter, the law of nations has
claimed binding force because states speak for the peoples that they represent. Even
nondemocracies have endorsed democratic principles in international relations, because
these give each state protection and an independent voice. Republican principles would
insist that every people deserves a voice in international affairs, because without it, as in
domestic politics, the common good will not be found, or realized. This makes the actual
identity of "peoples" a vital question. If every people, including subject peoples, enjoys the
right to self-determination, then what counts as a "people" will have significant legal
implications.
The use of the word people (populus) in international law derives from the republican
tradition in Rome ("respublicares estpopul")," according to which ultimate sovereignty
("imperium") belonged to the "people," or ordinary citizens, of Rome, whose state existed
to serve their common good.38 As Rome gradually conquered its neighbors in Italy and
around the Mediterranean basin (always, the Romans insisted, after "just" wars), the Romans
either incorporated the conquered populations into the Roman people, or made the
conquered territories provinces, and their inhabitants subject peoples. Both Grotius and
Vattel cited the example of the southern Italian city of Capua to illustrate national servitude,
since Capua lost every vestige of republican government after its total submission to Rome.39
The underlying assumption in the traditional sense of the word people, orpopulus, was that
individuals coalesce as a people by forming a state, which derives its sovereignty from their
consent. This sovereignty can be transferred by consent to others, but doing so undermines
the integrity of the people, by ceding their "liberty" to someone else.
The historical use of the word people to signify the citizens of a state, or residents of
a non-self-governing territory or province, was perpetuated by the United Nations, through
which existing states, including many multiethnic states, spoke as "peoples" to ratify the UN
Charter (Preamble; Article 110), forbidding interference with the territorial integrity or
political independence of states (Article 2[4]) and equating "peaceful and friendly relations
among nations" with the "equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (Article 55).
"Peoples" were described as the "inhabitants" of specific territories, and as such considered
deserving of "free political institutions" (Articles 73, 73 [b]). This usage should be familiar
to citizens of the United States, whose own constitution rests on the consent of the "people
of the United States" as a whole (Preamble), confirmed by the peoples of its territorially
distinct substates, meeting in their own local conventions (Article 7). Ethnic affinities do not
create a people without political and territorial independence, and many "peoples" have
expressed their right to self-determination through decolonization, despite extreme ethnic,
religious and cultural diversity, as in Africa and South America.4"
Secession
The republican origin and understanding of "peoples" in international law as essentially

territorial and political constructs suggests the missing criteria for evaluating claims to
separatism and popular sovereignty that simple assertions of a "democratic entitlement"
cannot supply. Each republican "people" shares a homeland, political institutions, and a
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strong claim to collective sovereignty. Subject peoples, whose sovereignty has been denied,
deserve their "liberty," according to republican doctrine, which is to say, they deserve to
enjoy those institutions of government best designed to serve the common good, including
popular elections, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and governmental checks and
balances." The first test of what constitutes a "people" is existing political boundaries.
Every sovereign state has a "people" within its borders-the people of Britain, the people
of Canada, the people of the United States, and so forth.
As these examples should illustrate, some states also contain subordinate or component
peoples, such as the peoples of Scotland, England, Maryland, Pennsylvania, or Quebec. All
these peoples enjoy stable borders and a measure of self-determination or popular
sovereignty in that they elect their own rulers, both at the provincial and the federal levels.
Republican principles would deny such "peoples" the right to secession, unless the federal
government abuses its power and violates the common good by discriminating against the
subgroup or province. Purposely to exclude some minority or subgroup of the population
from the common good of the citizens as a whole expresses the state's view that that group
does not in fact belong to the "people" that the state must serve and protect. Denying
elections, the separation of powers, independent judges, or any of the other basic attributes
of republican government to any portion of the population expresses that group's
nonmembership in the body politic, and therefore its right to secede.
This right to separation may have a strong ethnic component when states discriminate
by ethnicity, but ethnicity does not justify separation without a clear expression of exclusion
by the existing authorities. Even a showing of exclusion may notjustify separation, without
geographic realities to support it. Secession necessarily follows the territorial principle,
while ethnicity does not. Finding a new and geographically distinct homeland for oppressed
minority populations may often be so impractical (or unwelcome to its putative beneficiaries)
that such solutions should not be pursued. In such situations, the proper remedy for
violations of the republican principle would be reform or revolution, to prevent ethnic
discrimination in the future.
Conclusion
Republican principles reconcile separatism and the democratic entitlement in
international law by explaining how both relate to the common good of particular states, and
to that ofthe international community as a whole. Human nature naturally seeks community.
Many human goods would be impossible without cooperation between neighbors, including
large-scale cooperation in states. Cultures develop through proximity, which suggests certain
limitations on the optimum size of each political community. History has produced states
that avoid the natural limits of imperial consolidation. When states get too large they need
provinces, to bring government closer to the people.
The optimum size of such republics will vary according to circumstances, reflecting
ordinary happenstance, including historical, cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic and
geographical realities. The dominant projects of international law have been to stabilize the
boundaries between states and to bring their peoples into harmony for the common good, in
the same way that states should do so for individuals. Just as states should be republics, to
serve the good of their citizens, so the world community should respect republican
principles, to serve the good of all peoples. These principles include popular sovereignty
(applied through the democratic principle of election), but also the separation of powers,
checks and balances, an independentjudiciary and other fundamental human rights. Denying
these rights may justify revolution, or the creation of new and smaller separate republics.
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